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The debt  crisis  of the 1980's  has inspired  search  for innovative 
solutions  to the debt  problem.  Amongst  the many  proposals  that  have emerged 
so far, debt forgiveness  and debt conversion  schemes play a central  role.  One 
of the proposed  mechsnisms  for debt forgiveness  is to establish  an 
international  corporation  that will buy back the debt  of developing  countries 
and forgive part of it (see Peter  B. Kenen  (1983)).  The proposal  has been 
debated,  but so far no action  has been taken  toward  its implementation. 
Contrary  to the Corporation's  proposal,  debt conversion  schemes hse  been 
implemented  in a number  of  countries,  including major debtors  such  as 
Argentina,  Brazil,  Chile, Mexico  and the Philippines,  and they  are actively 
considered  by s number  of other  countries,  including Honduras,  Morocco  and 
Nigeria.  A typical  debt  conversion  scheme  specifies  conditions  for the 
exchange  of debt for domestic  assets,  the entities  that  may psrticipate  in  it, 
and longer-term  rights  end obligations.  In some cases  the schemes  are 
designed  for foreign  creditors  or  multinational  corporations,  in others they 
are designed  for domestic  residents,  where the intention  of  the latter  is to 
retrieve  flight  capital.  In  many cases  debt  for conversion  purposes  is 
aquired  on the secondary  market.  So far only a small  share of debt  has been -2- 
converted  by means of  these  schemes-  -about 2% of  the debt of  countries  that 
have engaged  in  them--but  they may become  much more important  in  the fucure. 
When  debt is exchanged  for equity  it is called  a debt-equity  swap (see Lewis 
S.  Alexander  (l987a) for more factual  details). 
One central  idea behind  the Corporation  and the debt conversion  schemes 
is to take advantage  of the high  discounts  on debt on  the secondsry  market. 
It is quite  common  for debts  to be traded  at 50  cents  to the dollar, with some 
debts being traded  at even  higher  discounts.  Hence,  it is argued,  debt 
forgiveness  may be not very costly  and the debtor  may gain  from the conversion 
of  cheap  debt into holdings  of  other  domestic  assets.  In both cases  the debt 
burden  is eased. 
This  paper is concerned  with debt-equity  swaps  in which  foreign  residents 
are a  party to the exchange  (i.e.  ,  it does not deal  with flight  capital).  As 
a byproduct,  I also  provide  two results  on debt  forgiveness.  T suggest  an 
approach  for dealing  with these  problems  and demonstrate  its usefulness  by 
addressing  a number  of  key questions  to which it can provide  an answer.  These 
questions  include  the following:  What  type of resource  reallocations  between 
debtor  and creditor  can  be achieved  by debt-equity  swaps?  What ere the 
conditions  under  which  there  exist swaps  that are beneficial  to both  parties? 
What  are the effects  of debt equity  swaps  and debt forgiveness  on investment 
in the debtor  country?  By  dealing with these  issues  one can examine  the 
usefulness  of the frsmework.  It should, however,  be made  clear  from the start 
that I suggest  a simple  framework  that can be extended  or modified  for 
particular  applications.  Here the concern  is with the clarification  of some 
fundamental  issues rather  than  with particular  applications.  For example,  I -3- 
assume  the existence  of  cspital  controls  in  the debtor  country  up to the point 
at which  there  ere no  private  capital movements.  This is convenient  for 
analytical  purposes  and it represents  a good  approximation  for some  countries 
(with effective  quantative  restrictions) .  One  may  want to modify  it for 
applications  to other  countries. 
A minimal  framework  for dealing with some basic  issues  is developed  in 
the following  section.  It is based  on the assumption  that the debtor's  real 
income  is a random  variable,  and that its foreign  debt is government  owned. 
As a result  of output  fluctuations  and limits on its ability  to tax,  the 
government's  capacity  to  service  debt  is also random.  Consequently,  it cannot 
make the required  debt  payments  in  all states of  nature.  A debt-equity  swap 
consists  of an exchange  of debt for claims  to the random  output. 
A characterization  of feasible  reallocations  of  the transfer  of resources 
from debtor  to creditor  across  states of nature  by means  of debt-equity  swaps 
is provided in  Section  II.  Given  the current  situation  in  which  swaps  are 
small relative  to the stock  of  debt,  the emphasis  is on small swaps.  I  show 
that small  Pareto-improving  swaps  do not always  exist.  I derive a  necessary 
and sufficient  condition  for their existence  and clarify  its economic  content. 
The implications  of the existence  of many creditors  are explored  in 
Section  III.  I show  that  due to the fact that debt of the type considered  in 
this paper (i.e.  ,  which  is fully  repaid  in some states  but only  partially 
repaid  in  others, with the subset  of states of full repayment  depending  on  the 
debt's  size)  is priced  nonlinearly  on international  financial  markets.  This -4- 
generates  an  externality  across  creditors.  Consequently,  there may exiat 
small  Pareto-improving  swaps  that  will not eventuate. 
In Section IV the model is extended  in  order  to deal  with investment.  It 
is shown that in  this framework  debt  forgiveness  reduces  share  prices  and 
investment,  and that a debt-equity  swap raises  share prices  and investment 
only if  the cost of the swsp in  terms  of equity  is sufficiently  high.  The 
negative  effect  of debt  forgiveness  on  investment  results  from  a positive 
income  effect in  the second  period  (the analysis  is conducted  in a two-period 
framework).  As income  increases  the demand  for equity  declines  as a result  of 
a decline  in desired  savings.  Consequently,  share prices  fall and so does 
investment  (for s more thorough  anmlysis  of debt forgiveness  see Elhsnan 
Helpmsn (1988b)).  Concluding  comments  are provided  in Section  V. 
I.  Minimal  Framework 
The Debtor's  output  is given  by  E,  where  denotes  a random 
productivity  shock and  E  represents  its constant  activity  level in 
production.  In  the market interpretation  of  the model  E  also represents  the 
number  of  equities  issued  by domestic  firms.  Due to controls  on international 
capital  movements  E  is owned  by domestic  residents.  States of nature  are 
identified  with  productivity  shock  levels.  Thus,  state  9  is the state  in 
which the productivity  shock  obtains  the value  0. 
The government  taxes  output  at the rate  t,  so that output  owners  receive 
income  (l-t)OE  in state  9.  In  particular,  the owner  of one unit  of  E  is 
entitled  to  (l-t)0  units  of output  in  state  0.  The government  has an 
external  debt  D.  Required service payments  on this debt, which consist  of -5- 
principal  plus interest,  are  RD  units  of output  in  every  state, where  R 
stands  for one plus  the interest rate.  Tsx revenue  is used to service  the 
debt.  I assume  that there  exist realizstions  of  the productivity  shock  at 
which  tax revenue  is insufficient  to  cover  the required  debt  service payment. 
This is supposed  to represent  the situation  of some major debtors who will  not 
be able to repay  their  debt  in all stetes  of nature  Formally, 
tOE < RD  with positive  probability. 
This implies  that there exists  a critical  value  0, defined  by 
— RD/(tE), 
such thst  debt is fu)ly  repaid  in the high-productivity  states  0￿G,  but 
cannot be fully  repaid  in  the low-productivity  states  OCOc 
It is assumed 
that  in the low-productivity  states,  in  which  tax revenue  falls  short  of debt 
service payments,  creditors  receive  the entire  tax revenue.  I also assume 
that  t  represents  the highest  possible  tax rate,  and that the government  has 
no other  sources  of income (the  case in which  some  domestic  firms are 
government  owned  will  be discussed  at a later stage). 
It  is clear  from this specification  that  apart  from  states  in  which  tax 
revenue is insufficient  to cover  debt repayment  (0<9)  there  typically  also 
exist states  in which  tax revenue exceeds  debt repayment  (G>Oc)  One needs 
therefore  to state explicitly  what is done  in these states  with tax revenue  in 
excess of debt  repayment.  For the purpose of this study  I assume that it is 
redistributed  to the public  as lump-sum  trsnsfers)  Under these  assumptions 
state-contingent  consumption  of Debtor  residents  is -6- 
(1 -  t)9E  for  C ￿  9, 
(2')  c(9) — 
(1 
-  t)OE + (tOE 
- RD)  for  C  9, 
where  consumption  in low productivity  states consists  of  after-tax  output  and 
cunsumption  in high productivity  states consists  of after-tax  output  plus the 
lump-sum transfer  tOE-RD.  Creditors  receive the state-contingent  payments 
tOE  for  O￿O 
*  c 
(3')  d (0) — 
RD  for  9￿0  c 
In this setup Debtor  residents  have  no explicit  decision  problem;  they consume 
their after-tax  output  plus  government  transfers.  Creditor  residents  recieve 
full debt repayment  in high  productivity  states and the tax revenue  in low 
productivity  states  - 
Now  consider  a debt-equity  swap.  Suppose  that  a).O  units  of debt  are 
swapped for  eD units of  equity, where  equity  is measured  in  units  of  E. 
assume that  the Creditor  cannot  take a short position in equity.  For the swap 
to take  place  the government  has to  acquire  the equity  or to provide  the 
Creditor with the resources  needed  for its acquisition.  There are several 
mechanisms  by means  of which this can be  done;  I  will discuss some of them in 
Section  IV.  At this juncture  the reader may find  it easiest  to assume  that 
the government  taxes  away  or confiscates  the needed  equity.  After the swap, 
required  debt  repayments  are  R(D-t)  in  every  state  and the Creditor  receives 
(l-t)0e  in state  9  on account  of equity  holdings.  Naturally,  for -7- 
sufficiently  small values  of  d  there still exist  States  in  which the 
government  cannot  fully repay  the remaining  debt.  Assuming  that foreign-owned 
income  from  equity  ownership  is also taxed at  the rate  t,  debt  is fully 
repaid  in  states that  satisfy 
t9E ￿  R(D -h), 
so that the critical value  9  ,  which now depends on  d,  becomes 
c 
(1)  8(A) — R(D - 
i.e.  debt is fully  repayed  in states  98(1)  and  the Creditor  receives  the 
tax revenue  in states  9￿9(d).  In this case the consumption  of Debtor 
residents  equals 
(1 -  t)9(E 
-  E)  for  8 ￿  8(d), 
(2)  c(9;d,E)  — 
(1 
-  t)9(E 
-  E)  +  [teE 
-  R(D 
-  d)]  for  9 
and the Creditor  receives  payments 
(1 -  t)9E + t9E  for  8 ￿  8 (d), 
*  C 
(3)  d (8;d,E) — 
(1  -  t)9E  + R(D -  A)  for  8  9(A). 
Thus,  the swap reduces  the Debtor  residents'  income from  claims  to output  in 
all states and it increases  their income from  government  transfers  in high 
productivity  states  as a result  of the easing  of the debt service burden. -8- 
Moreover,  it increases  the set of  states  in  which debt is fully  repaid.  These 
three factors  need to be properly  weighed  in order  to evaluate  the 
desirability  of the swap from the point  of view of  the Debtor.  The Creditor 
too hms to weigh  three  factors.  The swap increases  his income in  all states 
on  account  of equity  holdings,  it reduces hia income in high  productivity 
states as a reault  of lower debt  aervice payments,  and it increases  the set of 
starea  in which  he receives  full repayment  on the remaining  debt. 
In order  to evaluate  the desirability  of  awapa,  I aaaume  that a 
repreaentative  resident  of the Debtor  has a strictly  concave 
von Neuniann-Morgenstern  utility  function  u(c);  i.e.,  the Debtor  is riak 
averse.  His subjective  probability  distribution  of states--i.e.  ,  productivity 
shocks--ia  represented  by the cumulative  distribution  function  G(9),  defined 
on the interval  [D,+w).  Hence,  his expected  utility  from  a given  swap, 
(Ac),  is our welfare  criterion,  given by 
(4)  U(A,e) — r  u[c(9;A,efldG(9). 
Equations  (1), (2) and (4) provide  a valuation  of every  awap  from the point of 
view of the Debtor. 
As far as the Creditor  is concerned,  I aasume  that  he has access to 
international  financial  markets which  enable  him to hold a well  diversified 
portfolio.  Consequently,  his marginal  utility of state-contingent  payments  by 
* 
the  Debtor  are not affected  by the swap.  Let  p  (9)  denote  his marginal 
utility  of state-9 payments.  Then  his expected  utility  of a swap is -9- 
*  *  *  * 
(5)  U (A,e) — 
I  p  (8)d (8;d,€)dG  (8), 
Jo 
where  G*(8)  denotes his subjective  probability  distribution  function.  The 
Creditor's  valuation  of a swap is represented  by (1),  (3)  and (5). 
II.  Are Swaos Desirable? 
There  are several methods  of  analysis  that can be used to answer  the 
question  posed  in  the title  of this section.  I have chosen.to  start with a 
description  of the effects  of swaps  on  state contingent  peyments  of Debtor  to 
Creditor  in  order  to gain insight into their possible  role as risk  sharing 
devices.  This is followed  by a derivation  of  asset  indifference  curves  that 
will  be used in  subsequent  analysis.  In  particular,  they  will  be used to 
derive  a necessary  and sufficient  condition  for the existence  of saall 
mutually  beneficial  swaps.  As I have explained  in  the introduction,  this 
paper  focuses  on small swaps.2  These  tools  are then  used to shed  light  on  the 
question:  How likely  is the existence  of mutually  beneficial  swaps? 
First, consider  the effect  of  swaps  on  the state  contingent  transfers 
from  debtor  to creditor.  Schedule  DAB  in  Figure  1 describes  this profile 
prior to a swap.  The Debtor  consumes  the difference  between DC  and  DAB, 
where the slope of  OC  is  E  (the stock of equity).  Now,  given  a>O  and 
e—0,  the transfer  of resources  from Debtor  to Creditor  shifts  to  DAABA 
with 
the Debtor  consuming  the difference  between OC  and  OAAB. 
This describes 
the effect of debt forgiveness.  In  the case of a debt-equity  swap  it is 
necessary  to add to the resource  transfer  the return  on equity  (l-t)8e.  For 
sufficiently  small values  of  E  the  resource transfer  profile  becomes  0A5B5. -10- 
The resulting  change  in  the Debtor's  consumption  profile  is described  in 
Figure  2.  The Debtor  gains  in states which lie in  the interval  °1'2  and 
loses in all other  states  (except,  of course,  in  l and  The Creditor 
gains  in states  in  which  the Debtor  loses  and vice  versa. 
Now consider  the case in which  the productivity  shock  in the Debtor 
country  is idiosyncratic;  i.e.  ,  it is statistically  independent  of economic 
conditions  in the rest  of the world.  Then one experts  the Creditor's  marginal 
*  utility  p (9)  to be the same in  all states.  In this case the Creditor  will 
not agree  to swaps which  raise  the Debtor's  expected  consumption  level. 
Hence,  if  (i) both  parties  agree  on the probability  distribution  of  the 
productivity  shock;  and  (ii) the entire mass is concentrated  on two points, 
say  9L  and  9M  in  Figure  2;  then  there  do not exist mutually  beneficial 
swaps.  This result  stems from the fact that in this case a swap  reduces the 
Debtor's  consumption  in a low consumption  state  in which  the marginal 
utility  of consumption  is high,  and raises  it in  a high consumption  state 
in  which the marginal  utility  of consumption  is low (see the figure).  Suppose 
that  (i,e)  is chosen  so as to make the expected  value  of this consumption 
change  equal  to zero,  so ss to make the Creditor  indifferent  to the swap. 
Then the Debtor  will lose  from it, as we know from  the standard  theory  of 
choice  under  risk (see the discussion  following  Proposition  1)  .  This 
demonstrates  that there exist  conditions  under  which there do not exist 
mutually  beneficial  small swaps.3 
The general case is more easily  treated in asset apace  (dc).  For this 
reason  I present  in Figure  3 the asset  indifference  curves 
*  * 
U(d,e)  — TJ(D,D)  and  U (Ac) — U  (0,0) -11- 
for the ease of smooth  distribution  functions.  Every swap that leada  to 
points above  the Debtor's  indifference  curve and below  the Creditor's 
indifference  curve is beneficial  to both  parties.  Hence,  the figure 
represents  a situation  in which  there  exjst mutually  beneficial  awaps.  The 
Creditor's  indifference  curve  is concave and the Debtor's  indifference  curve 
can be concave  or  convex,  ralative  to the horizontal  axis (see Helpman  (1988a, 
Appendix)  for a formal proof).  It is instructive  to understand  the reasons 
for the particular  curvature  of  these  curves.  It is clear from Figure  1 that 
every  increase  in  A  increases  the set of  states  in  which the remaining  debt 
is fully  repaid  as well as repayment  per unit  debt in the other  states.  These 
changes  make the remaining  debt a more  valuable  asset.  For this  reason  the 
larger  A,  the larger  the Creditor's  loss from giving  up an additional  unit 
of debt.  Consequently,  he requires  a larger  marginal  compensation  in  terms  of 
equity in order to maintain  a constant  expected  utility  level.  This  explains 
the concave  shape of the Creditor's  indifference  curve.  Similarly  for the 
Debtor;  the larger  A,  the more  he stands  to gain  from a marginal  debt 
reduction.  Therefore,  at  the margin  he  has to give up more equity  per unit 
debt  in order  to maintain  a constant  expected  utility  level.  If  he was risk 
neutral,  his asset indifference  curve would  have  been concave,  just as the 
Creditor's.  However,  risk  aversion  introduces  convexity  into the indifference 
curve.  For these  reasons his indifference  curve  can  be concave  or  convex, 
depending  on the degree of risk aversion. 
From  equations  (l)-(5) one can calculate  the slopes of these asset 
indifference  curves -12- 
p[c(9;A,t)}(1  -  t)OdG(0) 
(6)  p(A,E) — [- U(A,e)/U(Ae)] 
— 
J  jz[c(0;A,E)]RdC(9) 
0(A) 
*  * 
*  *  *  p  (0)(l 
-  t)OdC  (9) 
(7)  p  (A,e) — [U(A,e)/UA(Ac)]  *  * 
p  (0)RdG  (0) 
where  p()  is the Debtor's  marginal  utility  of consumption.  For convenience 
*  * 
of  exposition  let  M—p(D,D)  and  M —p (D,D)  denote  the slopes  of  the asset 
indifference  curves at  the origin.  It is clear  from Figure  3 that there exist 
mutually  beneficial  small  swaps  if  and only if  the Crditor'a  indifference 
curve is steeper  at  the origin  than the Debtor's  indifference  curve.  Hence, 
Proyoaition  1.  There  exist  small Pareto-improving  debt-equity  awapa  if and 
only if  M*)M. 
In  order  to gain  a better  understanding  of  the circumstances  in  which 
there  exist  Pareto-improving  small swaps, consider  again  the caae in  which the 
Creditor'a  marginal  utility  of  resources  ia state-independent  and both parties 
have the same probability  asaeaments.  Aaaume  also that the entire  mass  of the 
distribution  is concentrated  on three states;  a low productivity  atate 
a medium  productivity  state  0M'  and a high productivity  atate  0H'  aa 
depicted  in Figure  2  (i.e.,  OL<O<OM<OH). 
The probability  of  atate  i  is -13- 
i—L,M,H.  Under these  circumstances  (6) and (7) imply: 




ItM9MPM  +  HGHH)/RMPM 
+ 






where  p. 
is  the Debtor's  marginal  utility  of consumption  in  state  i.  Due 
to risk  aversion  These  expressions  imply  that  M*>M  if and only 
if 
-  +  -  < MH°H 
-  - 
Hence,  when  i.e.  ,  there  are in  effect  only two states,  (8) implies 
* 
MM  ,  so  that  there do not exist mutually  beneficial  small  swaps, as I have 
argued before.  This suggests  that existence,  of Pareto-improving  swaps  is 
possible  only  when there  exists  a third high productivity  state  in which the 
debtor  gains  from the swap.  In  particular,  it is easy  to see that for every 
triple  of positive  probabilities  and values  of the low  and medium  productivity 
levels  there exists  a sufficiently  high  value  of  which  ensures  M*>M, 
and thereby  the existence  of mutually  beneficial  small  swaps  (p11  is declining 
in  It is also clear  that  (8)  is more likely  to be satisfied  the closer 
is to  i.e., when there  is low risk  aversion  at low to medium 
consumption  levels.  There  do not exist mutually  beneficial  swaps when 
i.e., when there  is risk  neutrality  at medium  to high consumption  levels. -14- 
To summerize,  there  do not exist mutually  beneficial  swaps  whenever  there 
exist  only  two states  or the Debtor  is risk  neutral  at medium  to high 
consumption  levels.  In  the other  cases mutually  beneficial  swaps  exist  only 
when there are sufficiently  high productive  states. 
III.  Many  Creditors 
My analysis  of  conditions  that ensure the existence  of mutually 
beneficial  swaps  is readily  applicable  to cases  in which there  exiata  a single 
creditor.  It is,  however,  often  the case that there  exists a large  number  of 
creditors.  If they  operate  in  concert, we can use the single creditor 
results.  However,  in  this case it is also necessary  to specify  a mechanism 
that determines  the way in  which they  split  the benefits  of awapa.  Which  swap 
ia agreed  upon  depends  then on  the bargaining  game  played  by the Debtor  and 
the consortium  of Creditors.  Every  bargaining  procedure  yields  its own 
result. 
In  this  section I take  up the case in which there exists a competitive 
fringe  of  Creditors.  In  this case it is still  true that  U*(t,e)  represents 
the valuation  of a swap  on international  financial  markets;  i.e.,  U*(,E)  is 
the value of  the remaiming  debt  plus the value  of  the mquired  equity.  In 
fact,  the linearity  of (5) together  with (3)  imply  that  this value can be 
*  *  * 
decomposed into  U (,e)—U  (A,O)-4-U (O,e),  where  the first  component 
represents  the value  of remaining  debt  and the second  represents  the value  of 
*  * 
equity.  The second  component  is linear in equity  holdings;  U (DE)U(OO)E. 
Hence,  the price  of equity, which  by a suitable  choice  of  units  equals 
is constant.  On the other hand,  the price of a remaining -15- 
unit of  debt,  which  equals U*(,O)/(D.),  is an increasing  function  of  A. 
The latter point follows  from  my  explanation  of the curveture  of  the 
indifference  curves  in Figure  3.  To  repeat, when  A  increases  the remaining 
debt  is fully  repaid  in more states  and the repayment  per-unit  debt in  other 
states  increases  as  well.  Therefore  the unit  value  of remaining  debt 
increases  (see Helpman  (1988a, Section 5) for a diagramatical  exposition  of 
this result).4 
What is the price of debt (in terms of equity)  that  the Debtor pays for a 
swap of size  A?  In the presence  of a competitive  fringe of  creditors  it is 
equal  to the post-swap  value of a unit  of remaining  debt.  For suppose  it is 
higher,  then  every  remaining  creditor  agrees  to swap  his debt at a lower 
price.  And if it is lower,  every creditor  refuses  to swap, because  the resale 
value  of his asset is higher than the offered  swap price.  Therefore,  the 
equilibrium  swap exchange  rate (i.e.  ,  relative  price)  is 
* 
U  (0,0) 
(9)  x(A)—  * 
U (A,0)/(D  - A) 
where  the denominator  on  the right  hand side represents  the equilibrium  price 
of debt  and the numerator  represents  the equilibrium  price of  equity.  Since 
the numerator  declines  in  A,  (9) shows  that 
Prot,osition 2.  The larger  the debt  to be swapped,  the lower  the price  the 
Debtor will receive  for his equity. -16- 
The nonlinearity  in the pricing of debt on international  financial 
markets  introduces  an  externality  across  creditors.  It  stems  from the fact 
that  when a single  creditor  reaches  a swap  agreement  the remaining  creditors 
make a capital  gain  on their debt.  The same argument  applies  to debt 
forgiveness.  An attempt  to buy debt on  the secondary  market  in  order  to 
forgive  it--as  in, say, Kenen's  proposal--  rsises  its price.  For this reason 
secondary  market  discounts  prior  to the availability  of information  on 
buy-backs  or purchases  of debt in order to forgive  it overestimate  the 
discounts  that  will prevail  when  the purchases  actually  take place  (see 
Michael  P.  Dooley  (1988)  and Helpman  (l988a, Section  6) on this  point).  In 
addition,  the free rider problem  that was discussed  by Paul  R. Krugman  (1985) 
can also  be cast in terms of this externality. 
The Debtor's  optimal  decision  is presented  in Figure  3.  The curve 
e-A/x(A)  represents  equilibrium  market  opportunities.  It is shown  in  Helpman 
(1988a, Appendix)  that its slope  is flatter  than  the slope  of the indifference 
curve  U*(.),  and it is located  to the right  of the indifference  curve.  This 
reflects  the above  discussed  externality.  Taking  advantage  of market 
opportunities,  the Debtor's  optimal policy  is to swap  units  of debt  for 
equity.  This  will raise his expected utility  to  U0.  Observe,  however,  that 
now the existence  of  small beneficial  swaps to the Debtor  requires  M<x(O), 
where  x(O)  is the slope of the  E—A/x(d)  curve  at the origin.  Clearly, 
since  x(O).cM*,  it  might  happen  that  x(O).CM.cM*.  In this case small 
Pareto-improving  swaps  exist, but will  not eventuate.  Hence, -17- 
Proposition  3.  In the presence  of a competitive  fringe  of  creditors  there 
exist circumstances  in  which no small swap  will take place despite the 
availability  of Pareto-improving  small  swaps. 
This result  points  out a  market  failure that  may result  from this externality. 
IV.  Investment 
This section  deals with the effects of debt-equity  swaps on investment  in 
the Debtor  country.  In the process  of  this analysis  I clarify  some taxation 
issues and the role of  government  ownership  of domestic  companies.  In order 
to deal  with these  problems  it is necessary  to somewhat  extend  the model. 
Assume  therefore  that there are two periods.  The discussion  in  the previous 
sections  applies  to the second  period, except  for the debt-equity  swap  that 
takes place  in the first  period.  Residents  of the Debtor  country choose in 
the first period  consumption cD  and the amount  of domestic  equity holdings 
e.  As a result  of  restrictions  on  international  capital  movements  they  cannot 
hold  foreign  assets  or borrow  abroad, so that equity  provides  the only 
instrument  by means of which  they transfer purchasing  power  from  the first  to 
the second  period.5  In this case  (2)  implies  that  second  period  consumption 
can  be written  as 
c(O;d,I,e)  — (1 
-  t)Ge  + T(9,d,I), 
where  I  equals  the  investment  level,  e—E-E  represents  Debtor  residents' 
holdings  of domestic  equity,  and  T(9,Ex,I)  represents  government  transfers. 
Transfers  are given by -18- 
0  for  9 ￿  9 (Al), 
(10)  T(9,A,I)  —  c 
t9E(I) 
-  R(D  -  A)  for  9 ￿  9(A,I), 
where  the number  of real equities  F  is an increasing  concave  function  of the 
investment  level;  i.e.,  E—E).  For this reason  the critical  state 
also depends on the investment  level.  The individual  investor  in equity 
chooses  e  taking A  and  I  as given. 
Now the representative  individual's preferences  over first-period 
consumption  and equity holdings  can  be written  as 
(11)  V(c0,e;A,I) 
— v(c0)  + 6  u[(l 
-  t)9e  + T(9,A,I)]dG(9), 
Jo 
where  the right hand side is equal  to the utility  from  first-period 
consumption  plus the discounted  expected utility  from second-period 
consumption,  with  &  being the subjective  discount  factor.  The individual's 
budget  constraint  is 
(12)  c0 
÷ qe ￿  y + qE(I) 
-  I  -  qC(A,I), 
where  q  denotes  the price of  equity,  y  denotes  first-period  output, 
qE(I)-I  represents  the net value  of domestic  firms  on the stock  market  (as in 
Peter A. Diamond  (1967)),  and  C(A,I)  represents  the cost  of the swap in 
terms  of  equity, with  qC(A,I)  being  the tax imposed  by the government  in  the 
first period  in  order  to squire  the resources  needed  for the swap.  In  the 
case of debt forgiveness  C(A,I)rnO.  Thus,  the left hand side represents -19- 
spending  on consumption  snd equity, while  the right  hand side represents 
resources  available  to the private  sector.  The cost  of the swap  is showed  to 
depend  on  I.  For example,  in the presence  of a competitive  fringe  of 
creditors  the swap exchange  rste  x()  is a function of  I,  because it 
depends  on  E.  I assume  that C()  increases  in  A. 
It is clesr  from this description  that for a given  investment  level  a 
swap involves  a substitution  of second-period  for first-period  taxes.  The 
government  increases  taxes  in  the first period  (in which the swap is 
performed)  and reduces net taxes  in the second  period  (in some  states). 
First-period  taxes  are needed  in  order  to obtain  the resources  required  for 
the swap.  These  csn be imposed  directly,  or indirectly  by  means  of printing 
money (inflation  tax) or issuing domestic  debt.  The current  model  cannot  dear 
with the monetary  aspects  of the problem.  But it should  be clear  that 
resources  for the swap  have to be extracted  one way or  another.  There  is an 
alternative  to taxation  if the government  owns domestic  companies.  Suppose, 
for example,  that  there  are no taxes in  the second period,  but instead  the 
government  owns a proportion t  of the domestic  companies.  In this case an 
equity  provides  9  units  of output in  state  9.  Now suppose  that the 
government  swaps  its own equity  for debt.  Then,  as long as the investment 
level  is constant,  the foregoing  analysis  goes through with every  share  in  the 
previous  case  replsced  by  (1 - t)  shares in  the current case,  provided 
tE(I)￿(l-t)e.  The last condition  states that  the government  has enough  shares 
to perform  the swap.  Combinations  of  partial ownership  and partial  taxation 
are also  possible.  The essential  point  is that if the government  owns equity, 
it is required  to redistribute  the excess of  its income from equity over  debt -20- 
repayment  to the private  sector.  The public  is indirectly  the owner  of 
government  companies  and its debt. 
The individual  chooses  c0 
and  e  so as to maximize  (11)  subject  to 
(12).  Denoting  by  s(c0,e;d,I)—V(c0,e;,I)/V(c0,e;d,I) 
his marginal  rate 
0 
of substitution  between  equity  and first period  consumption,  the first order 
conditions  of this  problem  yield 
(13')  q—s(c0,e;d,I). 
However,  due to the restrictions  on  capital movements,  the clearing  of the 
first-period commodity  market  requires  c0+Iy  and the clearing  of the  equity 
market  requires  e—E-C(d,I).  Therefore,  (13') and the market  clearing 
conditions  imply  that  the demand  price of equity is 
(13)  q(ii,I)  — s[y 
- I,E(I)  - 
Differentiation of (13) yields 
(14)  q, — - 
SeCd 
+ 
It shows  that the demand  price for shares  is affected  by two considerations. 
First,  the larger  the swapped debt  the more equity  has  to be relinquished, 
which leaves  domestic  stockholders  with  less equity  holdings.  Since  the 
demand  price  s()  declines  in  equity holdings,  this element brings  about  an 
increase  in  share prices.  Second, the swap has a direct effect  on the demand -21- 
price  for equity, which is represented  by the second  term  on the right hand 
side of (14).  This effect  stems  from  government  transfers.  The larger  , 
the  larger  the transfers  that the individual  receives  in  the second  period, 
and therefore  the less he values  equity  which is used to transfer  purchasing 
power  from the first  to the second  period  (i.e., S5  is negative).  This 
reduces  the demand  price for equity.  Consequently,  the change  in the demand 
price  depends  on which  one of these considerations  extracts  a stronger 
influence.  If  the former  is stronger,  the demand price  rises.  If the latter 
is  stronger,  the demand  price  declines.  The former  is zero in the case of 
debt  forgiveness.  Therefore,  in the case  of debt forgiveness  the demand  price 
declines. 
Given  an equity price  q,  the net value  of firms equals 
qE(I) 
-  I. 
I assume  that firms choose  the investment  level  so  as to maximize  their net 
value (see Diamond  (1967)).  Their  equilibrium  condition  is 
(15)  qE'(I) — 1. 
This condition  describes  demand  for investment  as a function  of  share  prices, 
or  alternatively,  the supply price  of equity  as a function  of the investment 
level. 
For every  A  conditions  (15) and (16) determine  equilibrium  share prices 
and investment.  The equilibrium  determination  of these variables  is described 
in Figure  4.  Curve  S  describes  the supply price  of equity  while  curve  D 
describes  the demand  price in  the absence of swaps.  The intersection  point  A -22- 
describes  equilibrium  investment  and share prices.  Now suppose  that a swap 
takes place.  It does not affect  the supply  curve.  However,  the demand  curve 
at point  A  increases  if and only if  the condition  for a demand  price 
increase  applies.  Namely,  if and only  if the cost of a swap is sufficiently 
high.  If it increases,  investment  and share  prices go  up; if it  declines, 
investment  and share prices  decline.  Therefore, 
qposition 4.  A debt-equity  swap raises  investment  and share prices  if and 
only if  the equity  cost  of the swap is sufficiently  high. 
Since  debt forgiveness  does not involve giving  up equity, this result alao 
implies: 
Proposition  5.  Debt  forgiveness  reduces investment  and share prices. 
The last  proposition  has important  implications.  It  shows  that  debt 
forgiveness  can  bring  about  a reduction  in the capacity  to repay  debt.  The 
decline  in investment  reduces  the set of states in which  debt  is fully  repaid 
and  payments  per unit  debt in  states in which  it is only  partially  repaid. 
For a fuller  discussion  of debt fotgiveneaa  see  Helpman  (1988b). 
V.  Conclusions 
Debt-equity  swaps  and debt forgiveness  are practical  issues  that require 
careful  analysis.  The results of this paper demonstrate  that  there  do not 
exist  simple  and clear-cut  answers  to a number  of major questions,  but they -  -23- 
also show  how to identify  relevant  considerations.  Some  of the conclur  ns 
are: 
1.  Small  debt-equity  swaps can  be beneficial  to both  parties,  but this is not 
always  the case. 
2.  In the presence  of a compecicive  fringe of  credicors  there  is a uniqe 
price  at which  a swap  of a given  size can be  performed,  with the pcice 
being  higher  the larger  the swap. 
3.  Under these circumstances  small swaps may fail to take  place  despite  the 
existence  of Pareto-improving  deals. 
4.  Debt forgiveness  may reduce  investment  in  the debtor  country,  thereby 
imposing  a secondary  cost via a reduction  of debt  service  payments. 
5.  A  debt-equity  swap  may increase  or reduce  investment. 
In  all cases with ambiguous  answers, we have identified  the conflicting 
elements  that  have to be assessed  empirically. 
Finally,  it is necesssry  to point  out thac in  practical  evaluations  of 
debt-equity  swaps  there exist  additional  considerations  that  have to be borne 
in  mind.  For example,  capital  controls  are typically not as tight  as assumed 
in  the model,  and it is therefore  important  to consider  the effect of a awap 
on net capital  inflow.  This is the more  so the larger  the deviation  of the 
shadow  price  of  capital  from  the market  price.  And there exists  the problem 
of "round-tripping",  which results  from loopholes  that enable  investors  to 
obtain  subsidies  embedded  in existing  swap arrangements  without  fulfilling  all 
other  obligations.  Naturally,  these problems  exist  on  top of the problems 
discussed  in  the paper  and they  deserve  separate  treatment. -24- 
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Footnotes 
* 
Tel-Aviv  University.  My work  on this paper  began when I was  a visiting 
scholar  in  the Research  Department  of  the International  Monetary  Fund, 
and continued  et MIT and Tel-Aviv  University.  Many  colleagues  and 
seminar participants  at the IMF, MIT,  Harvard,  Boston  University, 
Princeton,  Columbia,  Duke,  and Chicago,  contributed  to the clarification 
of  various  points.  I thank  them  all, and especially  Eduardo Borensztein, 
Guillermo  Calvo, Max Corden, Michael  Dooley, Rudiger  Dornbusch,  Assaf 
Razin,  Kenneth  Rogoff, and Lars Svensson.  Two referees  provided  useful 
comments.  The Horowitz  Institute  at Tel-Aviv  University  funded  part  of 
the research. 
Other alternatives,  such as the provision  of public  goods,  are also 
possible.  The important point is to specify  a mechanism  for the 
valuation  of these resources.  It  should, however,  be clear  that the 
choice  of a specification  affects  some of the results.  An example  of an 
alternative  tax structure  and its Implications  are presented  in  Helpman 
(1988a, Section  9). 
2  One may also consider  situations  in which the Debtor  becomes  a creditor. 
If, for example,  the Debtor  is risk  averse,  the Creditor's  marginal -26- 
utility  is the same in every  state,and both  have the same subjective 
probability  distribution,  then Pareto-Optima  consist  of allocations  in 
which  the Debtor  obtains  the same consumption  level  in every  state. 
These allocations  provide  perfect  insurance,  and they  can be attained  by 
means of  a swap in which  the entire debt  C  plus some  bonds issued  by 
the Creditor  are exchanged  for the entire  stock of equities  E.  Since my 
interest  is mainly  in  small  swaps,  this possibility  is not considered 
further. 
However,  in this case there  exists  a mutually  beneficial  small  negative 
swap.  My assumption  that excludes  short positions  in equity  holdings 
makes  negative  swaps non-feasible. 
This is similar  to the well known  result  that the value  of a unit  of a 
firm's  debt declines with its financial  leverage.  See,  for example, 
Robert  C.  Merton  (1974).  See also  Jeremy  I. Bulow  and Kenneth  Rogoff 
(forthcoming)  and  Alexander  (1987b). 
It is easy  to add a domestic  bond  market  to the model.  However,  in  the! 
absence  of  capital movements  this market  has to clear  at zero 
indebtedness.  Consequently  the following  analysis would  not be affected 
by this modification.  In  fact, one can calculate  from  what follows  the 
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